THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

Plato, Meno

1. Why does Meno's first definition (71e) fail to provide an analysis of virtue? Why does Meno's second definition (74) fail to provide an analysis of virtue?

2. Plato contends that it is impossible to know what is right and do what is wrong. What is his argument? Is he right? If not, why not? What, in your analysis, explains why we do wrong?

3.What is the connection between Socrates' discussion with the slave boy and the rest of the dialogue?

4. Early in the Meno the following difficulty is raised: "A man cannot search either for what he knows or for what he does not know. He cannot search for what he knows—since he knows it, there is no need to search—nor for what he does not know, for he does not know what to look for." (80e) How does Plato solve this problem? Is his solution satisfactory?

5. In the Meno, Socrates helps one of Meno's slaves to understand the geometrical properties of the square. He contends that it is by recollection that the slave came to know. What is the argument for the doctrine of recollection? Does Socrates demonstrate that the slave remembered what he came to know? If so, how? If not, what is wrong with the argument? How do you explain the slave's achievement?

6. In the Meno, Socrates concludes that "virtue [is] present in those of us who may possess it as a gift from the gods" (100b). How does he arrive at this conclusion? Is his reasoning sound? What other possible means of acquiring virtue does he consider? On what grounds does he rule them out? Are these grounds sufficient? Is his list of alternatives complete? If not, what did he leave out?

 

Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy

1. What is Descartes' method of doubt? What does he hope to achieve by it? What does he actually achieve?

2. Do we ever know that we are not dreaming? If so, how? If not, why not? How does Descartes argue that he knows? Are his arguments sound? If not, where do they go wrong? Does he have the resources to solve the problem?

3. Why does the existence or non-existence of God matter to Descartes' philosophy? Why does our knowledge of God's existence matter for Descartes? Is merely believing in God sufficient for his purposes? Why?

4. How, according to Descartes, do we know that physical objects exist? Are his arguments sound? What, according to Descartes can we know about physical objects?

5. In the fourth meditation, Descartes argues that God's perfection is compatible with our sometimes falling into error, but not with our being unable to avoid error. How does Descartes reach this conclusion? Is his reasoning sound? Could we always avoid error if we followed Descartes' method?

6. By the end of the third meditation, Descartes is satisfied that he knows that he exists, that God exists and that certain obvious-looking non-empirical propositions are true (e.g. that 2+3=5). Reconstruct his argument that he knows these things. Critically evaluate the argument. What objections can be raised against it? Are any of these decisive, or can they all be diffused?

7. Why does Descartes believe that the mental and the physical are essentially different? What leads him to conclude that the mind could not be physical and that the body could not be mental? Are his reasons sound?

 

Locke, Origins of Our Ideas and Knowledge, and Berkeley, Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous

1. If a tree falls in the forest and no one hears it, does it make a sound? How would Locke answer this question? How would Berkeley answer it? What reasons would each of them give? Who, if either, is justified?

2. When you see something red, you experience a particular, private color sensation. How do you know whether other people experience the same type of sensation upon seeing something red? Could the sensation you have when you see something red be qualitatively the same as the sensation I have when I see something green? How could we tell?

 

Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

1. Why does Hume maintain that there is no necessary connection among matters of fact? How does custom relate to matters of fact on Hume's view? If Hume is correct, how can we predict events in the future on the basis of our experience in the past?

 

Russell, "On Induction"

1. Russell says, "Domestic animals expect food when they see the person who usually feeds them. We know that these rather crude expectations of uniformity are liable to be misleading. The man who has fed the chicken every day throughout its life at last wrings its neck instead, showing that more refined views as to the uniformity of nature would have been useful to the chicken" (p. 217). Do we have any justification for believing that our own views about induction are anymore reliable than the chicken's? If so, what is our justification? If not, why not? Does Russell's discussion demonstrate that our views on inductive matters are justified?

2. What, according to Russell, leads us to think that the future will be like the past? Does he believe we are justified in thinking so? If so, what provides the justification? If not, why not? How, according to Russell, does the problem of induction bear on the knowledge we can have of the external world?

To return to the Philosophical Inquiry Study Questions main page, please click HERE.