Quiz 12

Foot, "The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect"
Thomson, "A Defense of Abortion"
Singer, "Famine, Affluence, and Morality"
Nagel, "War and Massacre"

1. According to Nagel, the Kantian view directly challenged by the possibility (moral)
conflict or dilemmas is:
a. the categorical imperative applies to all rational beings.
b. the good will is good in itself.
c. the moral worth of an action depends upon the motive.
d. "ought" implies "can"

2. According to Nagel, absolutism, focuses on:
a. what one does, while utilitarianism focuses on what will happen.
b. what will happen, while utilitarianism focuses on what one does.
c. both what one does and what will happen.
d. either what one does or what will happen, but not both at the same time.

3. According to Foot, the doctrine of double effect holds, roughly, that:
a. an act that is permissible if done directly (directly intended) may be impermissible if
done indirectly (as a foreseen consequence).
b. an act that is impermissible if done directly remains impermissible if done indirectly.
c. an act that is impermissible if done directly may be permissible if done indirectly.
d. an act that is impermissible if done indirectly may be permissible if done directly.

4. The distinction that Foot finds behind the doctrine of double effect, rendering it
plausible, is that between:
a. what we do and what we allow.
b. what we do and what we intend.
c. positive and negative duties.
d. what we intend to do and what we want to do.

5. One case that shows a clear advantage to the distinction between positive and negative duties over the doctrine of double effect is:
a. the case of the judge who to save 5 must find guilty 1 innocent.
b. the case of the runaway train where to save 5, the train must be steered to kill 1.
c. the case of abortion is which either the fetus or the mother can survive but not both, and we must choose which to save.
d. the case of abortion in which the fetus will die no matter what, but the mother can be saved only by aborting the pregnancy.

6. Thomson's violinist case is a counterexample to which of the following:
a. one may never perform an act resulting in the death of an innocent person.
b. abortion is wrong.
c. an act that is wrong if directly intended may be permissible if an indirect
consequence.
d. a fetus is a person.

7. A crucial disanalogy between Thomson's violinist case and most pregnancies that she addresses is the:
a. age of the person to which one is attached.
b. element of coercion.
c. length of time of the attachment.
d. attachment not being due to sex.

8. Thomson does not take her defense of abortion to apply to:
a. pregnancy for which precautions have been taken.
b. pregnancy where contraception is unavailable.
c. killing the fetus as well as ending the pregnancy.
d. rape or incest.

9. For Thomson, if you end the hookup with the violinist or pregnancy where it lasts only an hour then you:
a. violate the right of the violinist/fetus.
b. fall just below being a Good Samaritan.
c. act immorally.
d. fall below being a minimally Good Samaritan.

10. The "pod people fetuses" that float around until they find a good resting place to grow, such as a rug, is a thought experiment that Thomson offers to show that:
a. pregnancy is not a necessary condition for fetal development.
b. the destruction of such fetuses would not violate a right to life.
c. coercion is not necessary for the violinist case.
d. voluntary and known risk is insufficient for an invitation.

11. Thomson:
a. claims that the fetus is a person.
b. concedes for the sake of argument that the fetus is a person.
c. argues that the fetus is not a person.
d. supposes that the fetus is not a person.

12. On Singer's view, much of what we take to be charity is really:
a. optional.
b. selfish.
c. unethical.
d. duty.

13. Singer's main principle depends crucially on the affluent:
a. bearing responsibility for the threat of famine to others.
b. being not far away from those suffering under famine.
c. being able to give much aid to those in desperate need without significant cost to
themselves.
d. being obliged to give aid only at the level of others, who are similarly affluent.

14. For Singer, the extent of the obligation for the affluent to give aid is determined by:
a. what others should give.
b. what others are actually expected to give.
c. their own willingness to give.
d. their degree of responsibility to those under famine.

15. Singer's central principle seems to have the counter-intuitive consequence that most of us, who are affluent, are obliged to give:
a. much more than we actually do give.
b. much more than we think we should give.
c. until we drop near to the level needed to survive.
d. until we reach the level of giving that is standard.